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SCHOOL VIOLENCE: THE CALL FOR A CRITICAL 
THEORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
Karen L. Michaelis* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been an increasing focus on the 
"other" in literature, helping us to understand how enemies 
are created, who is identified as "the enemy," and why enemies 
are necessary to society. The literature on enemies intersects 
several fields from psychology, sociology, and philosophy, to 
groups within the legal academy. Educator Paolo Freire not 
only championed oppressed people, he sought to empower the 
oppressed by exposing the complementary roles played by both 
the oppressed and their oppressors. Similarly, sociologist 
James Aho described a process through which we can better 
understand the social construction of enemies and the corre-
sponding participation in that process by social insiders. In his 
book, Just Stories: How the Law Embodies Racism and Bias,1 
Thomas Ross explores the way the judicial system categorizes 
litigants as a means of reaching rational, objective, and thereby 
just decisions in particular cases involving society's outsiders 
such as the poor, racial minorities, women, and children. He 
concludes that the creation of any categories, based on per-
ceived differences of one group by another group embodying the 
social norm, on the surface, leads to predictability, rationality, 
and certainty in the law, and keeps power from the powerless. 
Ross describes a process whereby enforcers of the law are 
the first to determine if, or when, a law has been broken, ena-
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bling the enforcer (state authority) to use discretion in deciding 
under what circumstances a rule will be enforced. The use of 
discretion to decide when an authority figure will enforce a rule 
is shaped and colored by the authority figure's knowledge, ex-
perience, and biases. If the authority figure believes a member 
of a particular group, based on race, ethnicity, gender, or age, is 
usually guilty by his or her mere presence, then the authority 
figure will be more likely to target individuals who are mem-
bers of those groups, even for minor infractions. 2 
Feminist legal theorists, such as Deborah Rhode, Ann 
Scales, Linda McClain, and Patricia J. Williams, and critical 
race theorists such as Richard Delgado, Francisco Valdez, and 
Mari Matsuda have described in vivid detail the effect of a ju-
dicial system that Lawrence Tribe has described as "deeply out 
of sync with" our changing perceptions of the relationship 
among law, the state, and society."3 Feminist legal theorists 
and critical race theorists have long argued for a more contex-
tualized approach that takes into account that judicial deci-
sions change litigants' reality. 
Feminist legal theorists advocate for a judicial system that 
looks at a legal issue from multiple perspectives in an effort to 
find the best solution to legal conflicts, taking into account the 
unique facts in specific cases. Such an approach would not en-
sure a particular result; rather this approach would encourage 
judges to consider the impact legal decisions will have on the 
structure of society. 4 A feminist justice model focuses on the so-
cial context within which the conflict arose. But unlike the tra-
ditional justice model that focuses on individual rights and the 
common good as separate and distinct interests that always co-
exist in tension with each other, the feminist justice model 
rests on the presumption that the resolution of any conflict will 
be just if the multiple and varied perspectives of all those af-
fected by the decision are placed in the relevant social context. 
It is the coupling of the interests of the many individuals in a 
community with the social context that illuminates the path to 
the most just result. 
2. For a diagram representing the process described by Ross see Karen Micha-
elis, Searching the Enemy: A Legal Construct of' the Other, 5 JOURNAL FOR A JUST AND 
CARING EDUCATION 14 (April1999). 
3. Lawrence Tribe, The Curvature of' Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can 
Learn From Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989). 
4. See generally id. at 1. 
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Within the traditional justice model, individual rights and 
the community good are viewed as mutually exclusive inter-
ests, so that justice is viewed from only one perspective at a 
time. Such an approach separates the individual from the so-
cial context and leads to results that reflect only one perspec-
tive-that of the dominant culture-which is based on the simi-
larities among its members, thus alienating and ostracizing 
those who are different. Under the traditional justice model, it 
is not difficult to see how some individuals and groups would 
feel that the system treats them unfairly. 
Critical race theorists have argued that a judicial focus on 
the differences between members of minority groups and the 
social norm places too much emphasis on the importance of dif-
ference, particularly in circumstances where differences based 
on race, for example, tend to obscure judicial attempts to pre-
serve and perpetuate existing power structures. We have 
learned from feminist legal scholars and critical race theorists 
that legal decisions are made interactively within a social con-
text. When a judge sees himself or herself as part of the "rele-
vant 'social space,"''1 then the judge must acknowledge that the 
state plays a part in perpetuating the structure of society that 
keeps outsiders helpless and vulnerable.6 Children subjected to 
the juvenile justice system suffer injustices and prejudices 
similar to those experienced by women and minorities as well 
as members of other excluded groups. 
For it is the most vulnerable, the most forgotten, whose per-
spective is least akin to that of the lawmaker or judge or bu-
reaucrat and whose fate is most forcefully determined by the 
law's overall design-by its least visible, most deeply embed-
ded gaps and reflections.7 
Aspects of both feminist legal theory and critical race theory 
can be readily transferred to a critical theory of juvenile justice, 
but there is no political group comprised of members of the 
group of juveniles who could advocate for a new approach to ju-
venile justice. Therefore, there is no political pressure on soci-
ety or the justice system to force a change in the way juveniles 
are treated by the justice system that truly reflects the reality 
of juveniles from their perspective. How, then, can children ex-
5. ld. at 38. 
6. See generally Tribe, supra note 3, at 13-14. 
7. See id. at 13. 
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pect to be treated fairly by a justice system that ignores there-
alities of children? 
I will argue in the following sections, that juveniles are the 
most vulnerable of all individuals who come into contact with 
the justice system because of their real or implied powerless-
ness and because of the bias inherent in the stories about the 
juvenile told over and over by those in the media, government 
agencies such as schools, and ultimately, the courts. The sto-
ries incorporating judicial bias and prejudice ensure that deci-
sions affecting the lives of juvenile offenders appear rational, 
just, and inevitable. In our hierarchical society, juveniles have 
virtually no power to overcome the bias and irrationality of 
school disciplinary procedures, much less legal decisions. Be-
cause we do not consider the reasons why juveniles end up as 
criminals, we fail to consider the perspective of the juvenile in 
the process. Therefore, we have no right to expect juveniles to 
change their behavior to fit into a society that refuses to protect 
them when they are victimized, but is all too eager to punish 
them when they behave in an inevitably violent manner, fre-
quently in reaction to unjust decisions and life situations. First, 
I will argue that, according to feminist theorists, women con-
tinue to be subjugated by the political and social "norm," 
women being an important "other" in literature. Second, I will 
compare this subjugation of women to juveniles, who are even 
worse off in societal acceptance than are women. This will con-
stitute the bulk of my argument. 
II. A DISTRIBUTIVE MODEL OF JUSTICE 
Iris Young presents a compelling picture of the shortcom-
ings of the existing model of justice based on a distributive 
paradigm. Young argues that a definition of justice based on 
the distribution of goods keeps the focus on "things, income, 
and jobs,"8 but "fails to brin~ social structures and institutional 
contexts under evaluation." Through its emphasis on fairness, 
the distributive paradigm of justice promotes individualism 
8. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE. 24 (1990). 
9. The problem with modern political theory is that it accepts, outright, existing 
institutional structures as well as the notion that those institutional structures should 
be evaluated by normative criteria. Acceptance of institutional structures, in turn, "re-
duce[s] political subjects to a unity and ... value[s] commonness or sameness over 
specificity and difference." Id. at 20. 
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through the social construct of community. The purpose of 
community is to preserve individual identity (insofar as it does 
not interfere with the collective identity of the community as a 
whole) among members of the social group/community where 
sameness equals equality. There is a negative side of commu-
nity, however, for those who cannot meet the criterion of same-
ness. Such individuals present a threat to the community's 
identity. 10 Difference, Young argues, is viewed as opposition to 
the community's identity, and therefore difference is viewed as 
deviance that leads, in turn, to a devaluation of those individu-
als identified as different. In rejecting the distributive para-
digm of justice, Young argues for a model of~ustice that focuses 
on the effects of domination and oppression. 1 
Young identifies three issues that are ignored by distribu-
tive theories of justice: 1) decision making structures and pro-
cedures;12 2) division of labor; 13 and 3) culture. 14 The combina-
tion of these three elements leads to the domination and 
oppression, at an institutional level, of those individuals or 
groups viewed as different. As long as domination and oppres-
sion are institutionalized, there can be no movement toward a 
system based on social justice requiring a comparison of alter-
native patterns and a determination of which pattern is the 
t . t 15 mas JUS . 
III. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FEMINIST CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY 
The sameness/difference debate that has occupied a signifi-
cant place in feminist legal theory is a useful component in the 
10. !d. at 12 
11. "Such a shift brings out issues of decisionmaking, division of labor, and cul-
ture that bear on social justice but are often ignored in philosophical discussions. It 
also exhibits the importance of social group differences in structuring social relations 
and oppression; typically, philosophical theories of justice have operated with a social 
ontology that has no room for a concept of social groups." !d. 3. 
12. Decision making structures and procedures originate within corporate and 
legal structures. !d. at 23. 
13. "[C]oncerns the definition of the occupations themselves." !d. at 23. 
14. "[l]ncludes symbols, images, meanings, habitual comportments, stories ... 
through which people express their experience and communicate with one another." !d. 
at 23. 
15. "Rational reflection on justice begins in a hearing, in heeding a call, rather 
than in asserting and mastering a state of affairs, however ideal. The call to 'be just' is 
always situated in concrete social and political practices that precede and exceed the 
philosopher." !d. at 5. 
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construction of a critical theory of juvenile justice. But prior to 
exploring the significance in law of the sameness/difference de-
bate, it is necessary to define the appropriate approach or theo-
retical frame within which notions of sameness/difference can 
be discussed in a meaningful way. 
Part of the sameness/difference discussion must include the 
role language plays in perpetuating a legal system that easily 
justifies existing legal doctrines that effectively silence and/or 
punish particular identifiable groups of people as outsiders, 
thereby justifying their oppression. Feminist legal theorists 
such as Frug, Minow, Bartlett, and Rhode have used postmod-
ernism and poststructuralism as the means by which to study 
the language used by the legal system to construct the social 
landscape that privileges some and oppresses others. 16 
Language is the vehicle through which the legal system 
constructs the social reality where justice is done. How an 
event or the participants are described or characterized 
throughout the judicial process (the description and characteri-
zation of each party begins with the first telling of the event 
even before the parties find their way into court) frequently de-
termines who will prevail, because with each retelling, a social 
or moral value is placed on the interests of each party. The 
symbols of language are taught to us early on, and those sym-
bols shape what we see-what we perceive reality to be. As 
symbols of meaning, words create a mood and characterize 
people. Therefore, the individual who shapes the story gives it 
meaning through the choice of words used to describe the 
events. The words chosen, then, will determine and construct 
reality at a given moment. 
As some feminist legal theorists have pointed out, the no-
tion that justice is based on equality has led to universality 
with an emphasis on universal norms as the standard by which 
justice is measured. The universalist view that a theory of jus-
16. Frug defines postmodernism as: "a certain style characterized by wordplay; it 
is a way of seeing language as an agent of social construction; and it is a way of seeing 
the human subject as decentered, polymorphous, and indeterminate" in Barbara John-
son, Commentary: Response, The Postmodern in Feminism. 105 HARV. L. REV. 1076 
(1992). Minow states that "Postmodern work ... explores the multiplicity of meanings 
within language itself." Martha Minow, Incomplete Correspondence: An Unsent Letter 
to Mary Joe Frug. 105 HARV. L. REV. 1096, 1099-1100 (1992). Poststructuralism "refers 
to theories of interpretation that view meanings as a cultural construction mediated by 
arrangements of language or symbolic form." Deborah Rhode, Feminist Critical Theo-
ries, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 620 n. 8 (1990). 
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tice must necessarily be directed toward the common good of 
citizens within the community as a whole "tend[s] to exclude 
women or to make women's claims appear deviant when meas-
ured against established norms."17 A universalist approach also 
tends to discount the significance and/or "importance of differ-
ences among social groups"18 by elevating "social and legal 
practices"19 to the status of universal norms when in fact those 
practices are based on partial norms. 20 Ultimately, the question 
comes down to what difference does difference make in the so-
cial and political scheme?21 Focusing on this question should 
lead to a shift in our thinking about the concept of inequality. 
The shift would allow us to explore inequality as "systemic 
subordination,"22 thus allowing us to comprehend the inherent 
oppression certain groups suffer within the existing social and 
political realms. Much feminist critical legal theory urges adop-
tion of a feminist perspective to illustrate how significantly no-
tions of gender have invaded the underlying assumptions of 
how society is structured and, in turn, how those assumptions 
have led to legal structures as well as legal decisions which 
have severely restricted the lives and rights of women. 
By accepting as the norm the idea that moral value stems 
from rationality and objectivity, it is not difficult to conclude 
that women have much less moral value because in a gendered 
society, women are relegated to the private sphere where 
women's lives revolve around home and childbearing. Society 
restricts views of women to their sexuality and fragile emo-
tional nature making women unsuitable for participation in the 
public sphere where decisions about how society will function 
are made. Such decisions are based on the precept that ration-
ality and objectivity ensure a just society. 
Alternatively, men move in both private and public spheres. 
In the public sphere, men assume a rationality and objectivity 
that allows them to place a high value on their own moral 
17. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 6 (1990). 
18. !d. 
19. !d. 
20. !d. 
21. "Another consequence is to suggest that the question of equality is not 
whether there are 'differences' between the two groups subject to comparison but is in-
stead what sort of political and social difference the actual difference makes." !d. at 5-
6. 
22. "[T]he ultimate goal should be to develop an understanding of inequality as 
the systemic subordination of certain social groups." !d. at 6. 
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worth, a moral worth constructed and validated in the private 
sphere where men assert their authority over their wives and 
children in a microcosm of public society where their concep-
tion of a just society prevails. Extending that perspective from 
the private sphere to the public sphere, men assume they are 
capable of determining the best, most just rules governing all 
social behavior. The presumption is that the rational, male 
perspective encompasses and reflects all perspectives fairly and 
equally so that men are uniquely situated to determine which 
interests have the highest moral worth and therefore, are nec-
essary to achieve the common good. Because men are rational, 
decisions for the common good necessarily are made by men. 
Some relational feminists23 argue that rationality and objec-
tivity do not lead to just decisions because decisions that ignore 
the context in which an event arises, as well as the perspective 
of each of the participants, cannot be just. Likewise, decisions 
reflecting the decision maker's perspective alone cannot be just 
because the decision maker's bias and prejudices interfere with 
the ability to have a complete knowledge of each of the multiple 
perspectives of the parties involved. 
The tendency in law to separate reason and objectivity from 
feelings and subjectivity, thereby reifying abstraction over con-
text, has resulted in a legal system that ignores individual sto-
ries situated within specific contexts and governed by the facts 
of particular lives. The result is that, in many instances, indi-
viduals subjected to, restricted, and defined by norms based on 
the characteristics of people who share no similarities with 
them cannot avoid future interactions with a legal system that 
ignores the realities of their lives while forcing the individual 
to comply with a norm that simply does not fit. While this ap-
proach has a severely negative impact on women, it has an 
even more devastating impact on juveniles, who enjoy even 
"See generally, e.g. KATHERINE O'DONOVAN, Sexual Divisions in Law (1985); SUSAN 
MOLLER OKIN, JUS'riCE, Gender and the Family (1989); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth 
Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE 
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 117 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Carole 
Pateman, The Sexual Contract (1988); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender 
Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Work-
place, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (1989) [hereinafter Dowd, Work and Family]; 
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The Legal Status of Families, 77 CORm;LL L. REV. 992 (1992); 
Jane E. Larson, The Sexual Injustice of the Traditional Family, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
997 (1992); Francis Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal 
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). 
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lower status than do women. 
IV. THE VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC 
Public opinion supports the conclusion that American teen-
agers have become increasingly violent in recent years. That 
opinion has been shaped by the media, government, and "pri-
vate youth management interests."24 According to Michael 
Males,~5 our collective recollection about the peace and tran-
quillity of the behavior of teens in years gone by gives the im-
pression that the behavior of the teens of yesteryear was be-
nign. In comparison, today's teens are aggressive and violent. 
Males states: 
Back when we were kids, the standard grownup head-
shaker goes, it was a little running in the hall, talking 
out of turn, and neighborhood pranks. Then every year, 
the kids got a little worse and a little worse, and bam ... 
now it's homeroom crack carnage and schoolyard shoot-
outs.26 
But Males disagrees with the prevailing public opinion that 
today's teens are much more violent than teens of the 1960s 
and 1970s. Males contends that the current anti-youth move-
ment has been fabricated by government officials and private 
mental health organizations motivated not by an interest in so-
cietal causes of teen violence and aggression, but by profit. 27 
Further, Males contends that national statistics have been 
manipulated to misrepresent the incidence of teen crime, un-
wed births, and deaths due to drunk driving. Both Males and 
Humes28 agree that more children are being arrested for violent 
crimes than ever before, and "a majority of youth in jails, pris-
ons, and detention facilities [are] nonwhite, [and] incarcerated 
under criminal laws."29 Both Males and Humes agree that the 
24. "From the early 1970s ... to the early 1980s, decreases ranging from 5 percent 
to 80 percent were recorded in adolescent murders, violent crime rates, self-destructive 
and self-inflicted deaths, violent deaths in general ... , and drug deaths." Mike A. 
Males, THE SCAPEGOAT GENERATION: AMERICA'S WAR ON ADOLESCENTS 29 (1996). 
25. MIKE A. MALES, FRAMING YOUTH: 10 MYTHS ABOUT THE NEXT GENERATION 
(1999). 
26. Id. at 28. 
27. See MALES, supra note 25. 
28. EDWARD HUMES, No MATTER HOW LO!JD I SHOUT: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF 
JlNENILE COURT (1996). 
29. MALES, supra note 25, at 31. 
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public, supported by newer, harsher laws, is demanding a "get 
tough" approach to juvenile justice. Humes:30 captures the grow-
ing sentiment when he states: 
The system needs to be tougher on kids, imprisoning 
them longer, focusing more on protecting the public and 
less on protecting a youthful innocence that no longer 
seems to exist. For this group, the fix consists of pushing 
the juvenile justice system back toward the nineteenth-
century model, when adults and children were treated 
exactly the same. Juvenile criminals are more 
sophisticated and less remorseful than previous 
generations, prosecutors seem to agree. Treating 
today's child criminals differently from adults ... "flat 
out isn't working."31 
As public pressure increases on the justice system to make 
society safe from teen violence, government agencies seek to 
protect the financial interests of adults and the mental health 
system. The more the media interpret statistics in ways that 
make it appear that today's teens are more uncontrollable and 
violent than past generations of teens (distorting the perva-
siveness of teen violence by reporting only the most sensational 
teenage outbursts), the more we begin to view teens as deviant 
and morally unworthy of redemption. When the separation into 
"us" and "them" is accomplished, we then feel justified in loos-
ening the restraints on state agents to do whatever is neces-
sary to curb teen violence, while we concurrently create per-
suasive arguments against the need for strong protection of the 
Constitutional rights of juveniles. This process begins early. In 
fact, long before the juvenile justice system even becomes 
aware of many juveniles, school officials already have begun to 
shape the lives of many juveniles who will one day graduate 
from the school disciplinary system into the juvenile justice 
system, ultimately finding their way into the adult criminal 
justice system. 
In some instances, schools work in conjunction with the ju-
venile courts, beginning with truancy proceedings to ensure an 
early identification of potential juvenile offenders and a smooth 
transition of violent and aggressive teens from school discipli-
30. HUMES, supra note 29. 
31. !d. at 166, quoting Peggy Berkstrand, Assistant District Attorney, Los Ange-
les. 
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nary proceedings to juvenile court proceedings. Sometimes the 
relationship between the schools and the juvenile court is so in-
tertwined that the juvenile court judge uses the school as part 
of the weapon of punishment by ordering the juvenile to attend 
school on a regular basis. If the juvenile fails to attend school 
regularly, because he or she soon realizes that the system is 
overloaded and there is no one available to enforce the judge's 
order, the court then uses the teen's truancy as an indication of 
the teen's disrespect for the court's authority, thereby justify-
ing a harsher sentence when the juvenile court judge finally 
must sentence an ever increasingly violent teen to real jail 
time.:Jz 
Unfortunately for many juvenile offenders, it is the break-
down of the system at the earliest stages that leads to the crea-
tion of a hard-core juvenile offender. This occurs when a first 
offender fails to follow the judge's order and nothing happens. 
There is no negative consequence that follows the juvenile's 
noncompliance because there is no one who actively monitors 
the juvenile to ensure compliance. 33 
Just as small children test their parents to determine the 
boundaries of acceptable behavior in the home, teens often test 
those same boundaries in a broader societal context with the 
adult authority figures who exert control over them. The goal 
for small children not only is to learn what mom and dad ex-
pect them to do in various situations, but small children also 
seek their parents' attention, either good or bad. If no moral 
structure is provided, the negative attention-seeking behavior 
escalates until someone takes a stand and forces the child ei-
ther to correct the negative behavior or to take responsibility 
for the results of the negative behavior. 
Children who end up under court supervision frequently 
come from homes where either or both of the above conditions 
have not been met. Children from all socio-economic back-
grounds require such boundaries, but wealth and privilege do 
not insure that 1) parents know how to teach their children ac-
32. ld. 
33. "[Klids at every level of the system know the Juvenile Court often can't touch 
them. 'You talk to youngsters, ... and they tell you, repeatedly, that they got away with 
so much~that they commit crimes, but aren't arrested, or if they are arrested, when 
they are brought into court, nothing happens. That's common knowledge. If you expect 
that, you can get away with a helluva lot, that affects your behavior. You start making 
the kinds of calculations this boy in Juvenile Hall was making.'" I d. at 165. 
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ceptable behavior; or that 2) parents will pay attention to their 
children. The difference wealth and privilege make becomes 
clear when a child from a family considered to be successful, 
educated, or wealthy presents problems at school or in juvenile 
court. The outcome is usually less severe or punitive than the 
punishment for a child from single-parent, low-income, under-
educated families. The variable treatment, based on wealth, il-
lustrated by Humes as he recounts the story of a young Asian-
American juvenile appearing in juvenile court with a private 
attorney, paid for by the juvenile's family rather than the cus-
tomary public defender who is provided by the court at no cost 
to the defendant, 34 vividly demonstrates how some children are 
saved and others are sacrificed. Two questions arise when this 
process is carefully examined. First, how are particular juve-
niles selected for each category, redeemable or expendable? 
Second, why should certain juveniles be severely penalized 
when the system never paid them any attention when they 
were victims of an abusive family, an uncaring society, and an 
overwhelmed social service system prior to their reclassifica-
35 
tion as perpetrator? 
The juvenile court is the parent of last resort to many juve-
niles today. Similar to a nuclear family, there also are two 
functions that juvenile courts must fulfill as parents of last re-
sort. The first, arguably most important function of the juvenile 
court, is to teach children what the rules of society are so they 
may grow up to be independent, functional adults. Many juve-
niles are first introduced to the juvenile justice system as 
young children who have been abused, neglected, or abandoned 
by their parents. Humes describes the disappointment one 
34. "Judge Dorn is nodding his approval at Oh, a perfectly coifed private practi-
tioner from downtown LA hired by the family. She is a rarity in ,Juvenile Court, where 
the vast majority of kids get overworked court-appointed lawyers paid by the state, 
since most children are legally indigent and their parents cannot be forced to pay for 
their legal bills, even the ones that can afford to. Oh has already impressed the judge 
by filing extensive written motions, affidavits, and favorable psychological profile of 
John labeling him an ideal candidate for rehabilitation in the juvenile system (an ex-
pert opinion paid for by John's parents). All this had been neatly compiled in a bound 
volume with elaborate indexed tabs-again, a rarity. The assembly-line crush of cases 
is so great that most kids are lucky if they meet their lawyers before going to court, 
much less benefit from carefully researched pleadings ... [t]hose who walk into Juve-
nile Court like Oh, ignoring the peeling paint and futility, treating it instead as if it 
were the most important forum in the land, find a certain edge in Judge Dorn's court." 
Id. at 100. 
35. Id.; see generally, MALES, supra note 25. 
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young juvenile suffered when he realized that, as a victim of 
abuse and neglect, he did not qualify for the court's protection 
because, in these cases, often the court's goal is to preserve the 
family unit. The child entered the juvenile justice system in the 
hope of finding protection from a violent or nonexistent home 
life. Instead, the lesson the child quickly learned was that the 
file containing his life story, recounting the abuse he had suf-
fered, led not to protection but to additional abuse when he was 
returned home and later placed in foster care where the abuse 
and neglect continued.36 The severity of that disappointment 
fueled deep resentment and mistrust of the system despite the 
court's rhetoric of acting in the best interests of the child. 
The second function of the juvenile court is to punish juve-
niles who violate the law. The original purposes of the juvenile 
court were to correct and rehabilitate juveniles. Both categories 
of youths, abused or neglected children, and juvenile offenders, 
were viewed as young people in need of protection and rehabili-
tation. We currently are failing children in both categories by 
responding to the demands of adults. On one hand, parents 
demand the right to raise their children without state interfer-
ence. On the other hand, adult members of society demand pro-
tection from young criminals. In either case, juvenile courts are 
caught between their two functions, protection and rehabilita-
tion, with no perfect solutions on the horizon. 
The second lesson juveniles learn in the juvenile justice sys-
tem is that at some magic moment, the juvenile victim of abuse 
is transformed into a juvenile offender. 37 When that transfor-
mation occurs, the juvenile offender gets a glimpse of the sec-
ond way juvenile courts ignore the needs of children. Slowly, 
the lesson is internalized, and juvenile courts are overwhelmed 
with a never-ending flow of cases. If the crime is not serious, 
36. "The respected child psychiatrist who evaluated George said the boy would 
respond well in a stable, structured environment-something the Juvenile Court, in all 
the years it controlled George's fate, never managed to give him." HUMES, supra note 
29, at 108. 
37. "Despite its brevity, there was a hidden subtext to George's first hearing as an 
accused delinquent. It had transformed him-in the eyes of the law, at least-from a 
child in danger to a dangerous child. No one blamed the nameless bureaucrats who 
took an A-B student and sent him to a home troubled by drugs; there is no such ac-
countability in the system. No one asked how a ward of the court could become a gang 
member without anyone noticing. Only George was held accountable. His status as a 
300 ward had ended, his file in dependency court stamped with one large red word: 
'Terminated.' Officially, he was no longer a victim, he was a criminal, and that is how 
he would be treated forevermore." !d. at 112-13. 
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then the juvenile court judge merely goes through the official 
ceremony of noting the incident, and admonishing the juvenile 
to go to school and stop offending. The judge may even threaten 
more severe sanctions if the juvenile fails to comply with the 
judge's order and returns to court a second time. When nothing 
happens if the juvenile doesn't do as the judge ordered, the ju-
venile quickly learns that there really is no one actively moni-
toring his/her activities or compliance with the order. The ju-
venile begins to think that the juvenile court judge doesn't 
really have the power to interfere in any significant way with 
the juvenile's life. As a result, the juvenile pushes this bound-
ary, ultimately finding his/her way back into juvenile court, 
frequently in front of the same judge whose orders have been 
disregarded. This routine continues with the judge imposing 
more and more sanctions on the juvenile for failing to comply in 
the first instance. The cycle, however, comes to an abrupt halt 
as soon as the juvenile commits a serious crime in which some-
one is seriously injured or killed.:18 
At that moment, the juvenile court takes notice of the juve-
nile as if for the first time, except it is not the first time. Now 
the juvenile's file gains a prominence worthy of the court's at-
tention, and the juvenile's status as a victim of abuse over the 
years of childhood is recast as the cause of the current situa-
tion, and the inevitability of the juvenile's perpetrator status is 
supported by the earlier documentation.39 Severe punishment 
is justified based on the rhetoric of inevitability. 
V. DIFFERENCE AS DEVIANCE 
By focusing on difference and equating difference with de-
viance, the legal system can continue to force individuals to 
submit to existing universal norms as the system seeks to 
shape individuals to fit the existing social mold. For feminists, 
the problem with a "modern or masculine jurisprudence"40 is 
that an "ethic of justice," with its emphasis on individual rights 
and communal rules, 41 ignores the lives and narratives of a 
significant number of individuals. Lawyers and judges within 
38. See id. 
39. !d. 
40. Linda McClain, Atomistic Man Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Femi-
nist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1174 (1992). 
41. !d. 
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such a jurisprudence seem not even to be aware that there are 
other stories or lives that require voice. Once judges and law-
yers are made aware of others who differ from the norm, such a 
jurisprudence does not have a mechanism to adjust the appli-
cation of the law to enhance flexibility which would accommo-
date individual differences based on a variety of factors. They 
simply cannot see from the perspective of the "others." 
Additionally, applications of an ethic of justice have been 
interpreted to mean "that the person in the original position is 
self-referential and in perspective taking assumes that all per-
sons are like that very self."42 A feminist interpretation of the 
way the person in the original position responds is "to think 
from the perspective of everybody, in the sense of each in 
turn."4:J Thus, the existing legal system, based on rationality 
and objectivity, excludes anyone who differs from the person in 
the original position. 
Decision-makers in the existing legal system presume that 
their decisions are fair to all because their decisions are based 
on their own lives and experiences which make their decisions 
appear fair and just. Those differing from the person in the 
original position have virtually no chance for fairness because 
decision-makers cannot imagine what the lives of the "others" 
are like. As Ross illustrates repeatedly throughout his book,44 
judges bring their own experiences and biases to their deci-
sions. Those experiences and biases invade their decisions in 
ways that appear rational and objective from the perspective of 
the decision-maker. Those rational and objective decisions 
make sense only where those acted upon are members of an ex-
cluded class. If the race, gender, or age of the one acted upon is 
changed to that of the dominant group, the rationality and ob-
jectivity of the result quickly unravels because the underlying 
assumption that it is legitimate for certain classes of people to 
be subjected to more supervision and control than other classes 
of people disappears. 
One especially potent example in Ross's book is that of a 
welfare mother who finds herself in court facing termination of 
her AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) benefits 
because she refused to allow a social worker, who arrived un-
42. Id. at 1206-07. 
43. ld. at 1207 (quoting S. M. Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Jus-
tice, 99 ETHICS 229, 244 (1989)). 
44. Ross, supra note l. 
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announced, entry into her home, ostensibly to check the con-
tinued eligibility of the woman to receive AFDC benefits as 
well as the welfare of the woman's children. Ross points out 
that because the woman is on welfare, the state assumes that it 
is justified in monitoring her life without notice, regardless of 
the inconvenience to the woman. Using the tool of rhetoric, the 
court "transforms things into their opposites. Difficult choices 
become obvious, change becomes continuity. Real human suf-
fering vanishes as we conjure up righteousness."45 
The truth of Ross's words becomes clear when he makes one 
small, but significant change in the facts. Ross asks whether 
the judge or society at large would continue to justify the ac-
tions of the social worker if she attempted to check, unan-
nounced, and in the middle of the night, on the welfare of chil-
dren in a white, middle class neighborhood. The righteousness 
of the state's actions quickly loses its rationale simply by 
changing the characteristics of the affected family. 
The righteousness of the judge's approach in the welfare 
case is made to appear normal because such a comparison is 
never made. The legal narrative crafted by judges is 
"place[d] ... in a particular place and time."46 From there 
judges select which parts of the story to tell. 47 Selective exclu-
sion of certain details, which, if included in the story, would 
cast a different, possibly more balanced, view of the events, al-
lows judges to structure the reality of the specific events which, 
in turn, both justifies the specific decision and perpetuates the 
underlying assumptions about particular groups of people. 
This is the same process of creating an enemy described by 
James Aho48 in his study of white supremacists in Idaho and 
Washington who target certain individuals based on particular 
characteristics that generate hatred in the white supremacists 
triggering violence toward those targeted. The process of creat-
45. ld. at 20. 
46. Id. at 26. 
47. Id. at 26. 
48. JAMES ALFRED AHO, THIS THING OF DARKNESS: A SOCIOLOGY OF THE ENEMY. 
(1994); See also, Karen Michaelis, Searching the Enemy: A Legal Construct of the Other, 
5 JOURNAL FOR A JUST AND CARING EDUCATION, 209-32 (1999) (applying Aho's model 
for constructing enemies to the actions taken by public school officials who search stu-
dents labeled as troublemakers. When students challenge the actions of school officials 
in the legal arena, judges have frequently justified the behaviors of school officials in 
much the same way the court justified the actions of the social worker in Ross's exam-
ple of the welfare mother.) 
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ing enemies, as I have described elsewhere, also applies to the 
actions of school officials who target certain classes of students 
for intrusive searches or other punitive actions. 49 
According to Ross, the process begins with the "creation of 
[an] abstraction."fi0 The abstraction allows us to view those des-
ignated as "different from the rest of us,"51 and to manufacture 
generalizations about the moral worth of any group labeled as 
"different."fi2 We accomplish the division between "us" and 
"them" specifically to distinguish between our normalcy and 
their deviance.fi3 Ross explains that in law there are certain 
rhetorical devices used by judges for the purpose of creating an 
abstraction to justify a legal outcome that would not be consid-
ered rational given the social context within which the conflict 
to be resolved arose. 
Ross demonstrates the process of enemy construction in a 
story about racism using the rhetorical themes of "white inno-
cence,"fi4 "special favorites,"55 and "self imposed stigma."56 
These rhetorical themes of racism are carefully woven into the 
legal system. They also are themes widely accepted by mem-
bers of American society. These themes create a "paradox of ir-
rationality and normalcy"57 at the heart of "unconscious ra-
cism,"58 which leads to a conclusion that oppression based on 
an individual's difference is natural or inevitable. 59 As applied 
to the discipline of public school students, courts accept the 
precept that if parents have the right to discipline their chil-
dren to protect them from harm, then school officials, standing 
in the place of the parents during the school day, have the right 
to discipline and/or protect students as well. This is especially 
49. AHO, supra note 49. 
50. Ross, supra note 1, at 57. 
51. ld. 
52. ld. at 58. 
53. "The first step, the creation of the abstraction 'the poor,' is an easily over-
looked yet powerful part of the rhetoric of poverty. We are so used to speaking of the 
poor as a distinct class that we forget the rhetorical significance of doing so. By focus-
ing on the single variable of economic wealth and then drawing a line on the wealth 
continuum, we create a class of people who are 'them,' not us." Ross, supra note 1, at 
57-58. 
54. !d. at 21. 
55. !d. at 27. 
56. !d. at 30. 
57. Id. at 52. 
58. I d. 
59. !d. at 27. 
316 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2001 
true for those students characterized as troublemakers. In ju-
venile court, judges select rhetorical themes that are long-
accepted by society generally. Such rhetorical themes as: "juve-
nile villains," where juveniles are characterized as out of con-
trol, violent, and dangerous; and "adult innocence," where the 
actions of school officials are justified as necessary to the pres-
ervation of order in the educational environment and for the 
protection of students and adults from juvenile villains estab-
lishes the necessity for the expansion of juvenile court author-
ity as well as the expansion of the authority of school officials 
that follows. 
While the doctrine of in loco parentis as applied in the pub-
lic school context was terminated by the Supreme Court in New 
Jersey v. T. L. 0.,60 courts continue to apply this doctrine (usu-
ally under the guise of the school official's duty to preserve the 
educational environment) to children who enter the juvenile 
justice system, resulting in the justification of actions by school 
officials that parents might not take (i.e. searching their chil-
dren and then turning over evidence of crime to the police). As 
a result, students are subjected to a court system more con-
cerned about controlling children than salvaging their lives. A 
child who comes under the province of the juvenile court is 
forced to live with the court's decision regarding the child's fu-
ture and from which the child has no escape. 
When the court bases its decisions on presumptions about 
the life circumstances of an individual who appears in juvenile 
court and that individual's potential for successful transition 
into adult society, the biases of the judges will have a signifi-
cant impact on the outcome in specific cases. When the judge is 
swayed by statistics or news stories that portray juveniles as 
violent and out of control, then the judge is more likely to treat 
the juveniles who appear before him or her more harshly. How-
ever, this may unfairly penalize most juveniles who enter the 
juvenile justice system because, according to Males,61 the reli-
ance on statistics by government agencies and the media, has 
led to a distorted and overly bleak picture of the rate of vio-
lence among teens. Thus, the prevailing story about teens in 
America is that they are out of control and supremely violent, 
and if government agencies are not given the authority to con-
60. New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U. S. 325 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). 
61. MALES, supra note 25. 
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trol teens, then society as we know it will be destroyed. 
VI. THE ROLE OF RHETORIC AND THE USE OF MAGIC 
The narratives we bring to the formal rules of law are not 
just haphazardly chosen, they are inevitably connected with a 
vision of the world to come. Moreover, this world to come is al-
ways one we imagine to be just and righteous. 62 
Judges, as well as others in positions of power, occupy ex-
alted positions in relation to the majority of people. Their ex-
alted positions give them the power to tell the rest of us what 
the law is; what we as a people should value and protect. They 
accomplish this through rhetoric plus a little magic. 63 "The 
simple truth is that law cannot be coherently constructed with-
out a redemptive vision. The question for us is, which vision 
shall we pursue?"64 The choice that follows, then, is whose in-
terests shall the law redeem? That choice is made when the 
judge identifies the rhetorical theme(s) which sets the course 
the judicially constructed narrative will follow. The ~~ml is to 
make the rhetorical theme "intellectually coherent." " To en-
sure the acceptance of the rhetorical theme, the decision maker 
creates a story, a narrative, describing the conflict. To the con-
structed narrative, the decision maker adds his/her own inter-
pretive theory. The purpose of the interpretive theory is to cre-
ate an abstraction that separates the rhetorical theme from its 
social context. 66 The result is that the rhetorical theme 
achieves intellectual coherence and leads to the conclusion that 
the status quo is tolerable, even natural and inevitable. 67 In 
this way, decision makers are able to avoid the real issue of op-
pression because the entire issue is recast to create an explana-
tion of social reality from the perspective of the dominant 
group. 
Even when the issue is viewed from the "perpetrator['s] 
perspective"68 where members of the dominant group are 
characterized as the perpetrators, the abstraction of the theme 
from the social context allows the decision-maker to develop a 
62. Ross, supra note 1, at 17. 
63. !d. 
64. !d. 
65. !d. at 25. 
66. !d. 
67. !d. 
68. !d. at 41. 
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the social context allows the decision-maker to develop a narra-
tive explaining why members of the dominant group are not re-
sponsible for the resulting oppression. If members of the domi-
nant group are not responsible, then a remedy that would end 
oppression for a subjugated group would unfairly victimize 
members of the dominant group. Such a result makes sense 
only as long as the social context is ignored. That is, the deci-
sion-maker selects certain details of the story to include in the 
constructed narrative while omitting other details. The deci-
sion-maker carefully chooses those details to ensure that the 
resulting narrative absolves the dominant group of responsibil-
·t fi th ' . 69 1 y or ano er group s oppressiOn. 
This approach is being used in cases where students assert 
Constitutional rights, expecting protection from the punitive 
actions of school officials. This approach also ensures that we 
can always pose the question, who is the real victim? The an-
swer to that question will vary depending on how the interpre-
tive narrative is constructed. The one who constructs the nar-
rative, then, controls the outcome, regardless ofthe existence of 
a socially constructed, "objective" truth. 
VII. WHY WE NEED A CRITICAL THEORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
Short of heaven, our law will always reflect our imperfect 
moral worth. We will always possess stories about "the oth-
ers," those we fear and despise, whoever they may be. And the 
law will always embody those stories. 70 
As Ross explains, law consists of something more than 
merely a statement of the rules. Beyond the statutes and judi-
cial opinions, the law incorporates "[t]he choices and actions of 
69. The process begins when the judge identifies the rhetorical themes that will 
be used to characterize the perpetrator as "other," and to create a new victim who is a 
member of the dominant group. The judge, acting as storyteller, uses language to tell 
the story of the event, describing the individuals involved, explaining the need for jus-
tice, and determining how justice will be defined. This results in a narrative that con-
tains the constructed "truth" about the individual, the event, and the community where 
the event occurred. The narrative establishes the intellectual coherence of the rhetori-
cal theme and leads to the definition of the universal norm defining the boundaries of 
acceptable behavior, appearance, etc. The universal norm also highlights differences 
between people thereby creating insiders and outsider where difference is devalued. In 
a system defined by universal norms, difference is defined as deviance, thus, justifying 
punishment, in one form or another, for those who are different. 
70. ld. 
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the state's agents-police, prosecutors, judges, and juries-
determine the victim's and the defendant's experience of the 
law."71 Ultimately, the meaning of the law is determined in the 
first instance by the state agent who is the first to encounter a 
situation requiring application or interpretation of a law to a 
particular event. It is up to the first state agent who encoun-
ters an event to determine if a rule or law has been violated. 
And if it has, then that state agent determines how the state 
will respond to that violation. 72 The state agent, therefore, has 
discretion to determine not only if a law has been violated, but 
further, how the infraction should be characterized, and also if 
the infraction should be prosecuted. 
Applied in the public school setting, this means that a 
school official (usually either a teacher or a school administra-
tor, but it could be any school employee such as a custodian, 
bus driver, school secretary, or the like) is the first state agent 
to be required to determine what the rules and laws are, how 
those rules and laws have been interpreted and applied in the 
past, and how those rules and laws, and their interpretations 
apply or don't apply to the situation at hand. While most school 
officials strive to interpret laws in accordance with established 
interpretations, initial enforcement decisions are made indi-
vidually, often in isolation, and without a significant oversight 
or review mechanism in place to determine if the accusation or 
subsequent enforcement should have occurred in the first 
place. Because school officials exercise "virtually unchecked 
discretion,"73 it is the school official who is the first to announce 
to the public what the state's law is. This unchecked, initial 
process provides fertile ground for abuse of discretion fueled, at 
least in part, by individual, personal prejudices that may or 
may not be acknowledged by the state official. This, Ross ex-
plains, means that the "law will always accommodate the sepa-
ration and subjugation of those whom the powerful fear and 
despise."74 
This process gives great power to the state agents furthest 
removed from the judicial process entrusted to ensure fair and 
appropriate treatment of accused offenders. It also gives great 
71. Id. at 4. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 6. 
74. Id. at 1. 
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power to state agents to selectively enforce rules or laws, and 
this has the potential to institutionalize privileged treatment of 
certain individuals at the expense of the powerless. 
A. Language: Building Blocks of Righteousness 
There are at least two things accomplished through the 
careful selection of the language used to tell the story of the in-
crease in school violence. First, language is being used by 
judges to justify the need to treat juveniles harshly for a vari-
ety of behaviors.75 Second, language also is used to establish 
the innocence of school personnel and other students. 76 How-
ever, language also can be used to obscure or ignore the as-
sumptions about and biases against those individuals identi-
fied as "other."77 Examples of the assumptions and biases of 
courts have to do with the way adults in the school are charac-
terized. In Montalvo v. Madera USD Board of Education,78 
school administrators and personnel were described by the 
75. "School officials are keen observers of student conduct, and they need to pos-
sess the ability to act quickly when they observe suspicious behavior signaling either 
the imminent danger of, or the recent occurrence of, a discipline problem that could 
disrupt the school environment." Pennsylvania v. Cass, 551 Pa. 25 (Pa. 1998). "Teach-
ers and other school officials have significant and direct authority over impressionable 
young people in school classrooms and corridors. They are paid by the state to deter-
mine what is taught and how it is taught. They wield the power to control, evaluate, 
and discipline student behavior and performances." Sands v. Morongo Unified School 
District, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 899 (Cal. 1991). "It is the duty of school administrators to en-
force reasonable rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the school system, the 
students and the educational process in general." Bouse v. Hipes, 319 F. Supp. 515 (S. 
D. Ind. 1970). School official/school district "assumes a duty to protect [students] from 
dangers posed by anti-social activities-their own and those of other students-and to 
provide them with an environment in which education is possible. To fulfill that duty, 
teachers and school administrators must have broad supervisory and disciplinary pow-
ers." Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, at 982 (6th Cir. 1984), citing Horton v. Goose 
Creek Independent School District, 690 F. 2d 470, at 480 (5th Cir. 1982). 
76. "[T]eachers suffering serious injuries at the hands of violent students" " ... a 
teacher ordered an unruly student to her office and as a result, the teacher was vi-
ciously pushed against the wall breaking her pelvis." " ... a teacher disciplined a stu-
dent in the corridor; the student came back later with a knife and chain and attacked 
the teacher." "The legislature sought to preserve a feeling of security in teachers from 
would-be assaulters, ... and in the students and teachers, from armed attacks from the 
especially violent who resort to knives, nun-chucks, firearms, and other implements 
'capable of inflicting serious bodily injury."' In the Interest of D. S., 424 Pa. Super. 350, 
370-72 (Pa. Super. 1993). 
77. "[A]ppellant's history reflects numerous encounters with the law and a rejec-
tion of school discipline. State of Illinois v. Baxtrom, 81 Ill. App.3d 653, 659 (Ill. App. 
1980). 
78. 21 Cal. App.3d 323 (Cal. App. 1971). 
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court as "professionally trained ... competent and dedicated 
experts in the field of education."79 
Such language is designed to elevate school administrators 
and school personnel to a higher moral level than those over 
whom they have power. In so doing, courts cleverly begin the 
process of justifying whatever action the school official took0 
making that action seem necessary under the circumstances. 8 
Juveniles designated as "other" are described as "immature ... 
excitable and prone to be distracted from their tasks."H1 Most 
telling, though, is the language the court uses to ensure the ra-
tionality of a particular approach explained in its social con-
text. For example, Judge Stone, dissenting in Montalvo, stated: 
Such intrusions upon broadly defined constitutional 
freedoms [of students] are essential when the welfare and 
continued existence of society are weighed against the 
freedom of the individual to do as he pleases.82 
In constructing the narrative of justification, rhetorical 
themes are identified that characterize certain juveniles as 
"other." Rhetorical themes also are identified that help the sto-
ryteller to create new, innocent victims of juvenile violence, 
school officials (adults) and academically successful students. 
The juvenile court judge fills the role of storyteller. Being re-
moved from the social context where the event occurred, 
namely the school, the judge is able to construct the narrative 
of juvenile violence in schools through language that reflects 
the values and moral worth of education reflected in numerous 
court cases involving the rights of students against the school's 
and society's interest in safety and education. 
The language used by the juvenile court judge to construct 
the narrative of the event, the individuals involved, the need 
for justice, and how justice will be defined, is chosen carefully, 
revealing the weight the storyteller gives to the interests of 
each party. The weight of the words judges use in identifying 
the evil creates the path the judge will follow in redeeming the 
righteous. The judge's narrative yields a new, constructed truth 
about juveniles in schools that maintains existing power struc-
79. !d. at 330. 
80. "[H]air regulation is reasonable and rational and reasonably relates to ad 
serves to enhance the educational function and the health and safety of the pupils of 
said school district." !d. at 337. 
81. !d. at 331. 
82. !d. at 337. 
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tures as well as the socially imposed powerlessness of juveniles 
based on their status and age. The newly constructed "truth" 
pertaining to the severity and frequency of juvenile violence in 
public schools shields us from recognizing how the "truth" 
about juvenile violence really was constructed and how that 
"truth" embodies our current bias against certain juveniles. 
B. Language: The Tool of Subjugation 
On April 20, 1999, a terrible thing happened at Columbine 
High School in Littleton, Colorado. Two high school boys took 
vengeance on 14 students and one teacher, we learned in the 
days following the shootings because they were angry at every-
one at the school for ignoring them, for treating them as out-
siders. And for a moment, everyone's attention was focused on 
the two boys, the dead, Columbine High School, and Littleton, 
Colorado. 
At the outset, the media focused on the two boys who had 
killed fellow students in an effort to understand why two seem-
ingly usual teenaged boys would wreak the havoc we saw in 
this latest major incident of school violence. It was the first 
time, though, that there was a concerted effort to understand 
what motivated those two boys to kill so many. For the first 
couple of days, the media focused its attention on what makes 
quiet, intelligent, young boys feel alienated from and invisible 
to their peers and the adults at their school. We learned that 
the boys were in crisis because no one was listening to them or 
even saw the pain they tried to hide.83 
The focus on the two teen gunmen lasted a day or two, dur-
ing which the media, politicians, talk show hosts, and the 
President all concentrated on finding an explanation why those 
two boys would have committed such carnage. In the initial af-
termath, it seemed that we all knew the solution lay in under-
standing what could drive those two boys, as well as the pre-
ceding teen gunmen, to kill their peers and teachers. However, 
by the third day after the Littleton, Colorado school killings, 
the President, politicians, the media, and the public at large re-
turned to the more familiar response to these events by turning 
the conversation back to discovering who or what is to blame 
for these increasingly violent and deadly outbursts by teenaged 
83. WILLIAM POLLACK, REAL BOYS: RESCUING OUR SONS FROM TilE MYTHS OF 
BOYHOOD (1998). 
299] A CRITICAL THEORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 323 
boys. 
Blame rather than responsibility took center stage on talk 
shows and in the news. There was a renewed call for gun con-
trol and more stringent efforts to curb violence in movies as the 
means of stopping the spread of teen violence. A more insidi-
ous component was added to the list of blameworthy. The gun-
men themselves were blamed for the violence in Littleton. By 
blaming the gunmen, we were told that school officials were not 
responsible for the tragedy because school officials could not 
have known this incident would happen. They could have not 
have foreseen that the two boys in Littleton, Colorado would 
act out violently against their peers. But the question remains 
whether or not school officials really can escape all responsibil-
ity or blame for the teen violence that results from the isolation 
some boys feel that is nurtured within schools where certain 
students are ignored because they are not athletes; they are 
not popular; they are not noticed by anyone. In the aftermath 
of Littleton, William Pollack has received national attention for 
his book, Real Boys: Rescuing Our Sons From the Myths of 
Boyhood. In an interview on CNN the day after the Littleton 
shootings, Dr. Pollack stated that there is a "national crisis of 
boys in America that we do not talk about, we don't reach out 
to them, they are invisible."84 Further, Dr. Pollack stated that 
"we talk about violence in general ... we don't talk about the 
violence in boys."H" Some boys feel ostracized by their peers as 
well as the adults around them at school. Those boys come to-
gether, in some cases, as "a group of outcasts and they take 
86 
vengeance on the world." 
Pollack's message is clear. Some boys who have been la-
beled as outcasts by their peers and teachers feel isolated and 
increasingly angry. At some point, in some boys, the anger boils 
over into violence because those boys have not learned any 
other way of expressing their feelings that is consistent with 
the societal message that boys and men cannot show emotion 
or acknowledge feelings of vulnerability. According to Pollack, 
boys in America have been taught that to be stoic and strong 
appropriately demonstrates acceptable male behavior. Unfor-
tunately for some boys, this code of masculinity forces them to 
84. Interview with William Pollack on CNN, April 21, 1999. 
85. ld. 
86. !d. 
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internalize their feelings and emotions so that when their frus-
tration and anger builds, the appropriate, socially-taught mas-
culine response is to express that frustration and anger 
through violence. 
VIII. MAKING SCHOOLS SAFE FROM TEEN VIOLENCE 
The school shootings in Littleton, Colorado have turned our 
attention again toward understanding this increasingly fre-
quent, recurrent tragedy. In the aftermath of the earlier school 
shootings, we have searched for someone to blame. This latest 
school shooting has generated discussion that includes consid-
eration of the more personal, localized causes of teen violence 
in addition to the broader social issues of gun control and vio-
lent movies. 
Recently, the House Education Subcommittee on Schools 
and Violence,87 heard testimony from Dr. Kingery, director of 
the Hamilton Fish National Institute on School and Commu-
nity Violence, who offered several approaches that have been 
successful in curbing juvenile violence. Dr. Kingery testified 
that alternative education programs alone are not sufficient to 
address issues of juvenile violence. Such programs can be effec-
tive if offered in conjunction with services to the troubled teens. 
The purpose of education, plus services, is to ensure that teens 
prone to violence not only learn proper, nonviolent behavior, 
but they also are taught "the small focused skills necessary to 
change their behavior."88 
Representative Marge Roukema (NJ) stated that there is no 
coordination between the juvenile justice system and the school 
system. She suggests that everyone be brought into the system. 
That is, the juvenile justice system must work with the mental 
health department, schools, and the police in order to effec-
tively address the issue of teen violence. When pushed to offer 
an approach that works, Dr. Kingery told of a San Diego Juve-
nile Court judge who ordered inter-agency cooperation to facili-
tate the monitoring of juveniles and students. This example il-
lustrates that an inter-agency approach leaves little room for a 
juvenile to fall through the cracks because there are several 
87. School and Community Violence, Before Early Childhood, Youth, and Fami-
lies Subcommittee of the House Committee on Health, Education, and the Workforce. 
106'" Congress (1999) (statement of Paul M. Kingery). 
88. Id. 
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agencies monitoring the juvenile rather than a single agency. 
While many juveniles interact with several agencies, the differ-
ence in the San Diego example is that the Juvenile Court judge 
oversees the whole process which provides the necessary atten-
tion to how each agency is progressing, thereby reducing the 
likelihood that court ordered agency interventions will fall by 
the wayside. 
In addition to exploring new approaches to addressing ju-
venile violence, the House Subcommittee also heard testimony 
from a parent, Lyle Welsh, of a student killed in a school shoot-
ing. Mr. Welsh contended that the solution begins at home. The 
problem, according to Welsh, is that parents do not spend 
enough time at home. Therefore, they are not fulfilling their re-
sponsibility of "teach[ing] respect for life and academics."89 
Welsh commented further that parents and schools "have to be 
in unison. Schools must reinforce the home message," empha-
sizing "high academic performances." The climate has shifted 
with regard to how we will proceed on the issue of teen violence 
in schools. Littleton is the catalyst that has caused this recent 
shift. While we still are concerned about easy access to guns 
and the increased violence portrayed in the media, we have be-
gun to ask more pertinent questions about the immediate 
causes of teen violence. Rather than turning our focus outward, 
we have begun to ask what role parents, teachers, schools, and 
communities play in creating an environment where certain 
teens feel there is no other option than to kill those who are 
perceived as the cause of their isolation. That is where the real 
solution lies. Only by understanding why some teens choose 
violence as the solution to their pain will we, as a society, be 
capable of resolving the growing incidence of school violence. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
School shootings will continue as long as we ignore the root 
causes of the isolation some teens feel in their homes, at school, 
and in their communities. As long as we continue to believe 
that violent teens are different, therefore deviant, we can con-
tinue to believe that we are not to blame, at least in part, for 
maintaining the social and legal structures that isolate and 
punish those identified as "other." Juveniles will be subjected 
89. Jd. 
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to a system that mirrors an adult system that values social 
norms and excludes or punishes individual difference. Because 
the legal system and school systems ignore the perspectives of 
those individuals who are different, we can expect some teens 
to continue to act out violently in search of someone who will 
listen to their calls for attention and understanding. If we do 
not learn to decode the violence, we will continue to fall victim 
to that violence. A critical theory of juvenile justice that incor-
porates the unique perspectives and experiences of juveniles 
who enter the system is needed to salvage the majority of juve-
niles who find themselves reaching out for help in the only 
ways they know - violence and illegal behavior. 
